Soviet Military Strategy in Afghanistan: Errors in Planning and Public Condemnation
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.15826/qr.2020.2.469Keywords:
armed conflict in Afghanistan 1979–1989; limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan; war in Afghanistan 1979–1989; history of Soviet foreign policyAbstract
Referring to archival materials and historiography, the authors of this article examine the circumstances behind the development of principles regulating the presence of a limited contingent of Soviet troops in Afghanistan (1979–1989), its nature, and scope. It is concluded that Soviet military strategy in Afghanistan initially set itself limited goals and assumed limited obligations. It also used a narrow set of expert assessments, mainly those that fitted into the usual picture of a “cold” confrontation and the established paternalistic model of interaction with countries in the zone of the USSR’s ideological and political influence. The study shows that the Soviet state machine was largely focused on solving geopolitical problems, and the militarist directions of defence and law enforcement agencies and provided society with very limited information. The long-term consequences of the Afghanistan policy (especially internal and economic) at the time of the decision to send troops were practically not calculated, since the initial strategy was aimed at appeasing Afghanistan with the help of limited forces without active military operations. The contradictions between the geopolitical thinking of the Soviet leadership and the peculiarities of the Afghanistan military campaign, which did not fit into the expected strategy of full-scale military operations but at the same time immediately went beyond the “limited” impact, gives contemporaries a reason to deny the victory or defeat of the Soviet troops, but does not give them an opportunity to doubt the reality of hostilities and their negative impact on the relationship between the Soviet state and society.
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